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Book Reviews
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Railroaded
by William Huneke
Railroaded	is an uneven book.  Richard White’s research effort is quite evident, and he tells some 
wonderful stories, but the analysis is weak and the writing is often tedious.  White spent several 
years on this book, and at times he seems to have lost himself in the effort.
This book presents the history of the transcontinental railroads: the railroads that were built in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century from the Mississippi Valley to the Pacific Ocean.  It is a story 
filled with great characters: Jay Gould, Collis P. Huntington, James J. Hill, Charles Francis Adams 
Jr., Eugene Debs and more.  White even recounts some of the transcontinental railroad history in 
Canada and Mexico.  
White is passionate about this subject, too passionate. He writes like a web blogger rather than 
an unbiased, dispassionate historian. In his telling, all the railroad moguls are crooks, charlatans, 
or imbeciles.  His particular fondness for reciting the gaffes and stupidity of Leland Stanford is 
particularly ironic as White holds an endowed chair at Stanford University.
Perspective is a problem for White. He claims that the transcontinentals reoriented the United 
States from a north-south axis to an east-west axis. He cites how, prior to the transcontinentals, the 
United States was absorbed in slavery and the Civil War, which had a north-south orientation. But 
is that really true?
It is Columbus who refocused Europe to look west. Since Columbus, European settlers in the 
New World were always focused on moving west. White says that U.S. waterways primarily flow 
North-South except for the Erie Canal, which makes one wonder if he has looked at a map recently, 
e.g., Ohio, Missouri, St. Lawrence, and James Rivers are not primarily north-south. Moreover, the 
major eastern railroads, e.g., New York Central and Pennsylvania Railroads, ran east-west rather 
than north-south.
Another example of White’s questionable perspective is his conclusion that the transcontinentals 
brought corruption to American politics, but corruption allegations have been part of the American 
political scene since the American Revolution.  White reports the corruption and self-dealing that 
Jay Cooke engaged in to finance the Civil War and start the Northern Pacific Railroad, yet self-
dealing and corruption allegations were also leveled at Robert Morris, the prime financier of the 
Revolution.  
White’s analysis is too simplistic when he tries to make economic judgments.  He concludes that 
taxpayers got a bad deal from the Pacific Railroad Acts.  He recites all the aid the transcontinentals 
received, and refers to the work of economists Robert Fogel (1960) and Heywood Fleisig (1973-1974). 
White never mentions the fact nor critiques Fogel’s analysis that found the federal government’s 
return on the Union Pacific exceeded the government’s cost.  If the terms the government received 
on the Pacific railroads were so poor, why were not other investors available to offer the government 
better terms?  The fact is that the Pacific railroads were highly speculative ventures.   
White concludes that the Central Pacific (CP) and Union Pacific (UP) investors made huge 
fortunes with very little risk. With more rigorous analysis, Fleisig also concluded that UP investors 
made greater returns than commensurate with the risk they bore. White’s analysis adds nothing 
substantial.  His parade of financial figures just fogs the issue.
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His writing on the CP and UP financing can perplex a modern reader.  White falls into the 
nineteenth century mode of referring to excessive distribution of stock as “watering.” He then 
describes the railroads as being “overcapitalized,” but this will mislead those familiar with the 2008 
financial crisis.  Henry Paulson led an effort to inject capital into U.S. banks because they had too 
little equity – they were undercapitalized.  And this was precisely the problem with the CP and UP: 
too much debt and too little equity.
White’s characterization of the investors and the building of the transcontinentals is a sharp 
contrast to Stephen Ambrose’s version: Nothing	 Like	 It	 in	 the	World (2000). Ambrose stresses 
the engineering feats performed to get the first transcontinental built.  White is more interested in 
blogging about the financial chicanery and government corruption.  You could not find two more 
different books discussing a lot of the same story.
Where White’s book succeeds is in his discussion of labor issues involving the transcontinentals. 
Nineteenth century railroading was an extremely dangerous profession and railroads were not 
kind to their employees.  This created pressures to unionize. In his labor history discussion, White 
includes Eugene Debs and the Pullman Strike. Debs is an exception in White’s treatment of historical 
characters. White presents Debs as a strong leader who was trying to get the best he could for his 
followers.
Another serious weakness White has is his fondness for metaphors.  On page 7 White uses a 
particularly opaque cake and frosting analogy to describe Tom Scott’s relationship with the ethically 
challenged Secretary of War Simon Cameron in conducting government railroad business: 
The local rates and the corruption were, however, the frosting rather 
than the cake in the government-railroad relationship, and if Tom Scott’s 
great flaw was that he could never resist the frosting, he never mistook 
the frosting for the cake.  Since railroads lived on high-volume cargoes, 
the cake was the tremendous traffic in men and material that the Union 
war effort demanded. 
White abruptly drops Scott’s story and the reader is left to wonder what was the result (i.e., did 
Scott get cake or frosting or neither?)
White’s early twenty-first century perspective seriously biases his analysis.  In White’s view, 
the transcontinentals were creatures of big business and as such were instruments, which if not 
caused, certainly accelerated the destruction of plains Indians and the buffalo.  But how much effect 
did the transcontinentals truly have in these tragedies?
With the buffalo it is true that the railhead at Dodge City, Kansas, allowed buffalo hides to be 
shipped to the east, providing access to profitable markets; but those markets would not have existed 
if there had not been a significant improvement in tanning technology (Gwynne 2010, pp. 160-161). 
One should also note that the Dodge City railhead was not part of the original UP-CP route and 
might well have existed without federal support.
The transcontinentals’ role in the destruction of the plains Indians is similarly modest.  European 
settlers had been pushing the indigenous population westward well before the first rail was laid on 
the Baltimore & Ohio, let alone the UP and CP.  Furthermore, if care is taken to read the accounts of 
the Plains Indian wars, one will not find troops being deployed by rail like the Prussians in 1866 or 
1870 or like Longstreet’s corps at the Battle of Chickamauga. Rather, it is columns of cavalry and 
some infantry marching and riding to battle (Gwynne 2010, pp. 160-161). 
When White sums up the transcontinetals’ costs and benefits, he attempts to excoriate economic 
historians for not counting the costs incurred by Indians nor the cost of the destruction of the buffalo 
herds.  Because the transcontinentals had little effect on these tragedies, other scholars have been 
correct in not making such adjustments.
As White claims that prior attempts to use reductions in transportation costs or increases in 
land values are inappropriate (because these measures do not include the costs of the Indian and 
buffalo tragedies), White comes up with a novel and thoroughly misguided method to judge the 
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transcontinentals’ effects.  He compares the per capita incomes of the people living in the western 
states before and after the building of the transcontinentals.
This approach has so many flaws, it boggles the mind.  For starters, White uses current not 
constant dollars.  He does not adjust for the late nineteenth century deflation.  Additionally, the 
economist’s handy and often misused ceteris	paribus assumption cannot be invoked here.  In fact 
there were a lot of other things going on, such as crop failures and mining booms.  White’s approach 
also neglects to capture any benefits accruing to the U.S. economy in general.
Perhaps the core flaw is that White has not specified a precise effect to measure.  Is he trying 
to measure the effects of premature enterprise in the building of early transcontinentals?  Or is he 
trying to measure the general effect of western railroads?  A reader of White’s book often gets the 
sense that White would prefer the transcontinentals had not been built, which would have meant no 
Stanford fortune, no Stanford University, and no endowed Stanford history chair for Richard White.
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